Revised Control of Unfair Terms in Swiss Law – Consumer Protection by Competition Law? by Frei , Daphne & Jung, Peter
Articles (peer reviewed)
Daphne Frei and Peter Jung*
Revised Control of Unfair Terms in Swiss Law – Consumer Protection
by Competition Law?
In Swiss law the control of unfair terms is located in competi-
tion law (Art 8 Unfair Competition Act). After the revision of
Art 8 UCA in 2012 one can more than ever question this
positioning which is quite unique in Europe. After a short
presentation of the new Art 8 UCA which was inspired by
Directive 93/13/EEC and for the first time provides for an
unlimited content review of standard terms in Swiss law, the
following contribution demonstrates the negative conse-
quences of the positioning in competition law. The article
shows that an interpretation of Art 8 UCA in line with the
rules on unfair competition cannot achieve the unlimited
content review which was intended by the legislator. On the
other hand, the limitation of Art 8 UCA to consumer con-
tracts contradicts the general purpose of the UCA to ensure
fair and undistorted competition in the interest of all con-
cerned. Also the classical sanctions of competition law must
be adjusted in the case of unfair contract terms because they
are only designed for the sanctioning of unfair behaviour in
connection with the initiation of a contract but not for
declaring an unfair general contract term void. Therefore the
article argues that it is desirable to integrate the Swiss rules
on term control into the general law of contract or to deal
with this topic in a special act.
I. Introduction
After the revision of the provision containing the control of
standard terms in the Swiss Act against Unfair Competition
(UCA), the question should be re-assessed whether the UCA
is the correct location for the regulation of standard terms.
Special focus should be given to the question whether this
new provision yet increased the already existing typical diffi-
culties. The revised provision concerning standard terms in
Swiss law came into force in July 2012. The review of stan-
dard terms is located in Art 8 of the UCA. In fact, standard
terms are a matter of contract law. Notwithstanding this
classification, the Swiss legislator incorporated the only ex-
plicit provision concerning standard terms in the Unfair
Competition Act1. This location is nearly unique comparing
to other legislations in Europe2. The positioning of the provi-
sion in Swiss law is particularly remarkable since it was the
intention of the Swiss legislator3 to assimilate the new provi-
sion to Directive 93/13/EEC4 being characterized by a con-
tract law approach. The main intention of the legislator was
to create a provision which stands for an unlimited content
review of standard terms. The target behind this intention
was to guarantee an effective protection of the weaker party
against the user of standard terms which had not been possi-
ble under the former law demanding a misleading use of
general terms to the detriment of the other party5. The ques-
tion whether the revised Art 8 UCA will reach this target
mainly depends on how courts will interpret the vague legal
terms in this provision. Due to the similarity to Directive 93/
13/EEC as regards wording, also decisions of the European
Court of Justice can serve as a guideline for interpreting the
new provision in Swiss law6. This is a welcome opportunity
due to the conceivable lack of sufficient Swiss case law in this
field.
II. The Former Provision and the Main Changes of
2012
Under the former Art 8 UCA, a clause was considered to be
unfair if it deviated from the otherwise applicable law in a
misleading way to the detriment of the other party. The
criterion “in a misleading way“ was considered to be fulfilled
if the standard terms did not clearly show the significant
deviation from the applicable law, for example if they were
formulated ambiguously7. But the former Art 8 UCA was
not applicable if the standard term was clear, but unfair. The
court practice in Switzerland proved that an effective content
review of standard terms was not possible under the former
provision8. The reason for the inapplicability was further
caused by the combination of formal and substantive aspects
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1 Such an integration has already been proposed by an expert commission
in 1980 (Art 7 Draft text for a revised UCA of January 31, 1980, GRUR
Int. 1981, 169, 170); see in depth Walter Sticher, Die Kontrolle Allge-
meiner Geschäftsbedingungen als wettbewerbsrechtliches Problem
(Mengis&Sticher 1981) 110 ff (with a concrete proposal for a UCA-
provision at 215).
2 See for a comparative review Filippo Ranieri, Europäisches Obligatio-
nenrecht (3rd edn, Springer 2009) 376 ff; e. g. in Germany, the equiva-
lent provision to Art 8 UCA is located in contract law (§ 307 German
Civil Code) and a control of unfair general terms under unfair competi-
tion law is practised only in addition (see in depth Hajo Michael Holtz,
Die AGB-Kontrolle im Wettbewerbsrecht, Nomos 2010, 109 ff); any-
how in Norway Art 22 ff of the Marketing Control Act (Act No. 2 of
9 January 2009 relating to the Control of Marketing and Contract
Terms and Conditions; the text is available under: http://www.forbru-
kerombudet.no/id/11039810.0) provide also for a control of standard
terms based on unfair competition law.
3 Botschaft zur Änderung des Bundesgesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wett-
bewerb (UWG) vom 2. September 2009, BBl 2009, 6151, 6171, 6173
and 6179.
4 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in con-
sumer contracts, OJ L 95/29 ff.
5 Thomas Probst, in: Peter Jung/Philippe Spitz (eds), Bundesgesetz gegen
den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) – Kommentar (Stämpfli 2010) Art 8
para 29; Vito Roberto/Marisa Walker, ‘AGB-Kontrolle unter dem
neuen Art 8 UWG‘ [2014] recht 53.
6 The intention of the Swiss legislator to create with Art 8 UCA a norm
which is compatible with Art 3 Directive 93/13/EEC makes it necessary
to take also into consideration the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the
courts of the Member States concerning Art 3 of the Directive; see in
general for these methodological questions Thomas Probst, ‘Die Re-
chtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes als neue Herausforderung
für die Praxis und die Wissenschaft im schweizerischen Privatrecht’
[2004] BJM, 225, 246 ff, 258 and Peter Jung, ‘Das Argument der Euro-
pakompatibilität im schweizerischen Privatrecht’ [2010] ZSR 513,
538 ff.
7 Mario M. Pedrazzini/Frederico A. Pedrazzini, Unlauterer Wettbewerb
UWG (2nd edn, Stämpfli 2001) paras 12.12 ff.
8 Carl Baudenbacher, Lauterkeitsrecht – Kommentar zum Gesetz gegen
den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG), (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2001) Art 8
paras 27 ff; Ahmet Kut/Demian Stauber, ‘Die UWG-Revision vom 17.
Juni 2011 im Überblick‘, in: Jusletter vom 20. Februar 2012, para 109.
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in this provision. Several aspects were already partially cov-
ered by the review according to contract law9.
The decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court were not
in favour of an unlimited content review before the revision
of 2011 took place10. The Federal Supreme Court established
a limited covert or indirect content review based on the
question whether the standard terms were validly incorpo-
rated into the contract. According to this practice, standard
terms were not validly incorporated if they were integrated as
a whole into the contract and additionally were considered to
be unusual. This was the case if an average party should not
have expected this clause or if the clause surprised the other
party due to its lacking business experience11.
Under the revised Art 8 UCA, the criterion of “in a mislead-
ing way“ was replaced by the principle of good faith. Hence,
the only criterion which established a link to the law against
unfair competition – misleading acts being a typical category
of unfair competition – was removed. The second major
change concerns the scope of application of the provision:
after the revision, only standard terms used in consumer
contracts can be reviewed12. A parliamentary initiative was
placed in September 2014 wishing for an extension of the
scope of application of Art 8 UCA to all contracts13. Overall,
the new Art 8 UCA led to a large amount of discussion in
literature and it was also the reason for the well-nigh dismis-
sal of the entire unfair competition reform act in the parlia-
ment in 201114.
According to recent case law, the provision of Art 8 UCA is
of a mandatory nature and therefore cannot be excluded by
the parties15. An important question in practice concerning
the relation of the former and the revised Art 8 UCA is
whether the new provision should be applied also to standard
terms agreed upon before 1 July 2012. The UCA itself does
not answer this question. The Federal Supreme Court denied
the retrospective application of the revised provision to a
clause providing for an automatic prolongation of a contract
which was called into action before the revision came into
force16. Accordingly, the Federal Supreme Court argued that
the legal basis of a claim cannot be withdrawn retrospec-
tively17. If, however, a claim out of the standard terms arises
when the revised law is already in force, the claim might be
governed by this new provision18. The Federal Supreme
Court explicitly left this very controversial question open.
III. Elements of the New Art 8 UCA
According to the new Art 8 UCA, a term is considered to be
unfair, if it establishes a significant and unjustified dispropor-
tion between contractual rights and obligations to the detri-
ment of the consumer in contradiction with the principle of
good faith.
1. Significant and Unjustified Disproportion between
contractual rights and obligations
The disproportion has to be both significant and unjusti-
fied19. Additionally, the disproportion must violate the prin-
ciple of good faith. Unfortunately, although intending to
assimilate the new provision to Directive 93/13/EEC, Art 8
UCA does not contain a catalogue of possibly unfair terms
like the Directive does. Nevertheless, special focus has to be
laid on exclusion clauses, choice of law clauses or dispute
resolution clauses20. But like in the Directive 93/13/EEC,
such clauses are not automatically inadmissible. On the con-
trary, all circumstances have to be taken into account and the
overall situation has to be assessed. It is important to always
bear in mind the target of the revision: The legislator in-
tended to create a clear and simple content review mechanism
for standard terms. Therefore, some systematisation is neces-
sary in order to prevent a shapeless content review21.
The Federal Supreme Court has not decided yet what is meant
by a significant and unjustified disproportion between con-
tractual rights and obligations. In fact, the deviation from the
applicable legal framework can no longer lead to the unfair-
ness of standard terms by itself22. This is because this tradi-
tional reference point was dropped in the new provision23.
But the question remains: How can we state a significant and
unjustified disproportion of contractual rights and obliga-
tions without any reference to the applicable contract law?
Since the rules proposed by the legislator serve as a justified
and proportional default rule, they would serve as a sustain-
able guideline. Therefore, if a certain contract is governed by
specific legal provisions, these provisions should still serve as
a referral system to assess the fairness of the standard terms24.
However, if a contract does not fall under a specific classifica-
tion, the court has to establish which rule the legislator had
created and which provision two equal parties had agreed
upon25. Possible criteria to assess the disproportion are first
the one-sidedness of the allocation of rights and obligations in
the contract26, and second the purpose of the contract27.
The disproportion is significant if the one-sided allocation of
contractual rights and obligations is of a certain intensity and
if this allocation leads to considerable legal consequences for
the disadvantaged party28. For example the waiver of the
causality requirement of Art 38 (2) Insurance Contract Act
(insurance exclusion for late notification) in the standard
terms of an insurance company would lead to inacceptable
consequences for the insurant29. According to the new provi-
9 Thomas Probst (supra note 5) Art 8 para 52.
10 Carl Baudenbacher (supra note 8) Art 8 paras 20 ff.
11 Instead of many others DFT 135 III 227, C. 1.3. (Leading Decisions of
the Federal Supreme Court; German: BGE; French: ATF; Italian: DTF);
Carl Baudenbacher (supra note 8) Art 8 paras 12 ff.
12 Mario M. Pedrazzini/Frederico A. Pedrazzini (supra note 7) para 12.11.
13 Parliamentary Initiative Beat Flach of 23 Semptember 2014 (Business
Number 14.440).
14 Ahmet Kut/Demian Stauber (supra note 8) para 2.
15 Commercial Court Zurich of 17 December 2014, E. 2.3.1.
16 DFT (BGE/ATF/DTF) 140 III 404.
17 DFT (BGE/ATF/DTF) 140 III 404, C. 4.4.
18 Vito Roberto/Marisa Walker (supra note 5) 60 ff; Lorenza Ferrari Ho-
fer/David Vasella, in: Marc Amstutz et al (eds), Handkommentar zum
Schweizer Privatrecht (2nd edn, Schulthess 2012) Art 8 UWG para 63.
19 Andreas Furrer, ‘Eine AGB-Inhaltskontrolle in der Schweiz?‘ [2011]
HAVE 326.
20 Jörg Schmid, ‘Die Inhaltskontrolle Allgemeiner Geschäftsbedingungen:
Überlegungen zum neuen Art 8 UWG‘ [2012] ZBJV, 1, 12 ff.
21 Esther Widmer, Missbräuchliche Geschäftsbedingungen nach Art 8
UWG (Dike 2014) para 254.
22 Esther Widmer (supra note 21) para 264.
23 Markus Hess/Lea Ruckstuhl, ‘AGB-Kontrolle nach dem neuen Art 8
UWG – eine kritische Auslegeordnung‘ [2012] AJP 1188, 1197.
24 Jörg Schmid (supra note 20) 11.
25 Florent Thouvenin, in: Reto M. Hilty/Reto Arpagaus (eds), Basler Kom-
mentar UWG (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013) Art 8 para 128.
26 Markus Hess/Lea Ruckstuhl (supra note 23) 1199; Florent Thouvenin,
‘Art 8 UWG: Zur Strukturierung eines strukturlosen Tatbestandes‘,
Jusletter vom 29. Oktober 2012, para 46.
27 Ahmet Kut/Demian Stauber (supra note 8) para 120; Thomas Koller,
‘Art 8 UWG: Eine Auslegeordnung‘, in: Susan Emmenegger (ed), Das
Bankkonto. Policy – Inhaltskontrolle – Erwachsenenschutz (Helbing
Lichtenhahn 2013) 40.
28 Markus Hess/Lea Ruckstuhl (supra note 23) 1199 and 1201.
29 Andrea Eisner-Kiefer, ‘AVB und der revidierte Art 8 UWG’ [2015]
HAVE 28; see also Volker Pribnow/Barbara A. Möri, ‘Adäquanz im
Gefechtsstand – Tinnitus nach Knalltrauma und anderen Unfällen’
[2015] HAVE 48, 56 considering an exclusion of indemnity in standard
terms of an insurance company to be a significant disproportion of
rights and obligations; but the Federal Supreme Court held a different
view in its decision FT (BGer/TF/TF) 5C.55/2005 cons. 2.3.
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sion which should provide for a stricter review, not only the
intensity of the discrepancy, but also the essentiality of the
involved rights and obligations are decisive to determine the
significance of the disproportion. Accordingly, a slight devia-
tion from a fundamental provision can be equal to a substan-
tial deviation from an insignificant provision30. Correspond-
ing to this opinion, the German Supreme Court decided that
a provision in standard terms stands for unfair business con-
duct if it violates the fundamental principles the applicable
law is based on. A provision is also considered to be unfair if
it provides for obligations which do not exist in the respective
legal framework31. The German Supreme Court further
raised the question whether or not the legally required situa-
tion could also be reached without allocating significantly
more obligations to one party.
The disproportion further needs to be unjustified. It is chal-
lenging to determine the independent meaning of the term
“unjustified“32. In fact, the disproportion of contractual
rights and obligations of the parties already indicates an
unjustified situation33. It is worth noting that only the Ger-
man version of Directive 93/13/EEC contains the term “un-
justified“, whereas this term is missing in other languages.
Nevertheless applying the present wording, the different in-
terests of the parties and the possibility of risk governance
should be taken into account to assess whether or not the
discrepancy is justified34. Additionally, the power relation-
ship between the parties and the characteristics of the specific
contract play an important role in answering the question
whether the disproportion is reasonable35. Therefore, the
disproportion might be justified if the consumer had a real
chance to conclude the contract without the standard terms
and if the nature of the contract normally leads to a certain
disadvantage for one party36. For example it is common
business practice to exclude liability in standard terms gov-
erning the sales of used cars37.
2. Violation of the Principle of Good Faith
The second innovation in the wording of the new Art 8 UCA
is the reference to the principle of good faith which replaced
the so-called „misleading criterion„ in the old version. First
of all, it has to be clarified whether Art 8 UCA refers to the
general principle of good faith in private law or to the auton-
omous definition of good faith in competition law which
equals unfairness according to Art 2 UCA38.
In the context of the law against unfair competition, the focus
is not on the content of the agreement, but on the positions
and the behaviour of the parties before and during the con-
clusion of the contract. Furthermore, Art 8 UCA is located
amidst special provisions against unfair behaviour which
have the objective to protect the fairness and functioning of
competition itself in the collective interest of all stakeholders
and not to protect consumers as individual contractual par-
ties39. This is why, in the light of competition law, the con-
tent review would be of an abstract nature, not taking into
account the specific situation of the parties. Accordingly, the
content review would only be a mechanism to protect the
consumers in their entirety as important market participants.
Furthermore, Art 8 UCA would have to be applied in line
with one of the case groups pointing out the unfair behaviour
under Art 2 UCA, like for example misleading, aggressive
and blocking behaviours40. For example, the case law con-
cerning aggressive behaviour would only be applicable if
several customers only agreed to the incorporation of stan-
dard terms due to excessive psychological pressure. At least,
it should also be possible in Swiss law like in German law41
to consider the fairness rules concerning general terms to be
relevant for competition. Accordingly, the breach of these
rules should be regarded as an unfair act of competition fall-
ing under the omnibus clause (Art 2 UCA) aiming also to ban
an unfair advantage in competition by a breach of law rele-
vant for competition42.
From a teleological perspective, it was the objective of the
revision to provide for an unlimited content review according
to the principles of contract law. Also from a European point
of view, the reference goes towards the general principle of
good faith allowing for an unrestricted weighting up of par-
ties’ individual interests.
3. Consumer Detriment
It is doubtful what the third new element of Art 8 UCA “to
the detriment of the consumers“ shall mean. It is not yet clear
if the disadvantage for the consumer should be the result of
an overall assessment of the whole individual contract43 or if
one can just focus on the rights and obligations established in
the standard terms themselves. This abstract point of view is
the predominant opinion in Switzerland relating to the new
version of Art 8 UCA. The content review of the standard
terms should no longer be made looking at one individual
case44. However, the European Court of Justice considers all
circumstances upon contract conclusion45 and also has a
30 Thomas Koller (supra note 27) 17.
31 German Supreme Court (BGH) 8 October 2013 (XI ZR 401/12) BGHZ
198, 250 (the bank’s standard terms provided for an obligation of
successors to prove their inheritance rights even in clear situations and
at the bank’s own discretion); see for a commentary on this decision in
the light of Swiss law Oliver Arter/Fabian Klaber, ‘Deutscher Bundesger-
ichtshof, Urteil vom 8. Oktober 2013 (XI ZR 401/12)‘ [2014] AJP
1124. If one criticizes the legal provisions as a reference system under
the new Art 8 UCA because exactly this part was dropped, the parallel
to this argument of the German Supreme Court does not work (espe-
cially since the German provision does still consider a term to be
generally not appropriate if it disregards the essential principles of the
applicable law).
32 Thomas Koller (supra note 27) 46, who denies the own meaning of the
supplement “unjustified“.
33 Hubert Stöckli, ‘Der neue Art 8 UWG – offene Inhaltskontrolle, aber
nicht für alle‘ [2011] Baurecht 184.
34 Esther Widmer (supra note 21) paras 270 ff.
35 Esther Widmer (supra note 21) paras 270 ff.
36 Cf. Esther Widmer (supra note 21) paras 272 ff.
37 Markus Vischer, ‘Zur generell-abstrakten AGB-Kontrolle nach UWG‘
[2014] AJP 964, 973.
38 See for the differences between Art 2 UCA and Art 2 Swiss Civil Code
Jürg Müller, Einleitung und Generalklausel (Art 1–2 UWG), in: Roland
von Büren/Lucas David (eds), SIWR V/1 (2nd edn, Helbing Lichtenhahn
1998) 47 ff and Carl Baudenbacher (supra note 8) Art 2 paras 16 ff.
39 Peter Jung, in: Peter Jung/Philippe Spitz (eds), Bundesgesetz gegen den
unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) – Kommentar (Stämpfli 2010) Introduc-
tion para 15 and Art 1 para 45.
40 See in depth for these case series Peter Jung (supra note 39) Art 2
paras 33 ff.
41 According to the German Supreme Court (BGH), GRUR 2010, 1117
paras 26 ff (with further references to case law and doctrine remaining
divided also after the ruling of the Court) the use of unfair contract
terms falls under § 4 number 11 German UCA (unfair advantage in
competition by a breach of rules relating to competition); see in depth
for the controversial discussion in German law Hajo Michael Holtz
(supra note 2) 130 ff.
42 See for this case group which is not yet recognised by the Swiss legisla-
tor, but only by two decisions of the Federal Supreme Court (BGE 71 II,
233, 234 ff; BGer 4C.338/1997 sic! 1999, 156 – Kamov) in general Carl
Baudenbacher (supra note 8) Art 2 paras 300 ff and Peter Jung (supra
note 39), Art 2 paras 107 ff; for the applicability of this case group to
the professional use of unfair contract terms Walter Sticher (supra
note 1) 180 ff and Peter Jung (supra note 55) 144 ff.
43 Mario M. Pedrazzini/Frederico A. Pedrazzini (supra note 7) para 12.11;
Thomas Probst (supra note 5) Art 8 para 66. This opinion was espe-
cially common when the old version of Art 8 UCA was in force.
44 Markus Vischer (supra note 37) 964, 968.
45 ECJ at 15.3.2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:144, Case C-453/10 (Pereničová
and Perenič), para 44.
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look at other clauses in the individual agreement. Contrarily,
according to the abstract view, the compensation for the
disadvantages on the side of the consumer, e. g. a price reduc-
tion, is only decisive if it is located in the standard terms,
too46. In order to have a valid compensation for the disad-
vantage, the customer must have the possibility to choose
between the reduced price and paying the full price for the
uncompromised performance47.
In order to be detrimental in the sense of Art 8 UCA, the
standard terms must impair the position of the consumer in
comparison to the position of the user of the standard
terms48. Nevertheless, an effective disadvantage does not
have to be proved, it is sufficient that the allocation of rights
and obligations is suitable to impair the position of the
consumer49.
The UCA also does not contain a definition of the term
consumer. Therefore, one part of the doctrine50 refers to the
definition of consumer contracts established in Art 32 (2)
Civil Procedure Code and Art 120 (1) Federal Statute on
Private International Law defining consumer contracts as
contracts on supplies for ordinary consumption intended for
the personal use of the consumer or his family and offered by
the other party in the course of its professional or commercial
activity. The other part of the doctrine refers to the broader
definition of Art 2 (b) Directive 93/13/EEC and of Art 3
Swiss Consumer Credit Act (SCCA) defining the consumer as
any natural person who is acting for purposes which are
outside his trade activity, business or profession51. Although
this second definition is closer to Art 8 UCA, bearing in mind
that the Swiss legislator intended to assimilate the new provi-
sion to Directive 93/13/EWG, the definition in the Consumer
Credit Act is too narrow and too broad at the same time. On
the one hand, Art 8 UCA should not only be applied to
natural persons because the addressee of the standard terms
needs not to be protected because it is a natural person but
due to its inferiority and inexperience compared to the user
of the standard terms52. Additionally, the applicability of
Art 8 UCA should not be limited to end consumers as long as
the resale is not a professional one. On the other hand, a
considerable professional use should already exclude the ap-
plicability of Art 8 UCA53. An employee acting in the field of
his professional activities should also not to be considered as
a consumer in the sense of Art 8 UCA because of his exper-
tise54.
IV. Control of General Terms by Competition Law?
As mentioned above, the new wording of Art 8 UCA is not
only vague, but its interpretation is also aggravated by the
unclear nature of a provision deemed to be a provision of
contract law but located in the law against unfair competi-
tion. There are various problems to deal with from a contract
law perspective as well as from a competition law point of
view55.
1. The Misplacement of Content Control from a
Contract Law Perspective
The location of Art 8 UCA in the Unfair Competition Act
leads – if taken seriously – to some restrictions of the scope of
application which are not appropriate in the eyes of a con-
tract lawyer. First of all, the UCA is only applicable if an act
of competition in the sense of Art. 2 UCA is concerned. The
behaviour of the user of the standard terms must therefore be
able to appreciably influence competition56. Nevertheless, it
is not required that the user of the standard terms intends to
affect competition nor that he wants to make profit57. An
actual impact on competition does not have to be proved,
either58. However, there remain some cases in which an
effective content review is not possible: first, the requirement
of an economic purpose forbids the content review in cases
where the standard terms are exclusively subject to private or
sovereign use. Second, the control pursuant to unfair compe-
tition law is questioned if the standard terms are used in
illegal markets. Third, the applicability of the UCA is dis-
puted if a monopolist drafted the standard terms or if all
relevant market participants use the same version. From the
perspective of contract law, especially in this constellation,
the weaker party should be protected. Fourth, the content
review pursuant to competition law is not possible in cases
where the potential influence on competition is not appreci-
able59.
However, if the UCA is not applicable due to these restric-
tions, the review of standard terms can still be accomplished
through the before-mentioned limited indirect content review
established by the Federal Supreme Court60.
Another main problem of the new provision is the qualifica-
tion of the Art 8 UCA in Swiss International Private Law.
The question arises whether we have to determine the compe-
tent jurisdiction and the applicable substantive law according
to the rules of international unfair competition law61 or
according to the rules of international contract law62. If the
invalidity of the incorporation of standard terms is consid-
46 In this sense, Andrea Eisner-Kiefer (supra note 29) 28.
47 Andrea Eisner-Kiefer (supra note 29) 28 (concerning the causality re-
quirement in insurance company’s standard terms); in general Markus
Hess/Lea Ruckstuhl (supra note 23) 1188, 1206.
48 Laurent Bieri, ‘Le contrôle judiciaire des conditions générales – Réflex-
ions sur le nouvel article 8 LCD‘, in: François Bohnet (ed), Le nouveau
droit des conditions générales et pratiques commerciales déloyales
(Helbing Lichtenhahn 2012) 47.
49 Dominique Junod Moser, Les conditions générales à la croisée du droit
de la concurrence et du droit de la consommation, Etude de droit suisse
et de droit européen (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2001) 226.
50 Andreas Furrer (supra note 19) 326; Eugénie Holliger-Hagmann, ‘Arti-
kel 8 – das Kuckucksei im UWG‘, in: Jusletter 20. Februar 2012, para 9;
Ahmet Kut/Demian Stauber (supra note 8); Sylvain Marchand, ‘Art 8
LCD: un léger mieux sur le front des intempéries‘ [2011] Have 328,
330.
51 Guido Sutter/Florian Lörtscher, ‘Klagerecht des Bundes gegen missbräu-
chliche AGB‘[2012] recht 93, 100.
52 See also Pascal Pichonnaz, ‘Le nouvel Art 8 LCD – Droit transitoire,
portée et conséquences‘ [2012] BR 140, 141; see for the prevailing
opposite view Jörg Schmid (supra note 20) 8 and Florent Thouvenin
(supra note 25) Art 8 para 82.
53 For a broader application of consumer protection rules in cases of a
mixed usage for private and professional purposes however Melania
Lupi Thomann, Die Anwendung des Konsumkreditgesetzes auf Miet-,
Miet-Kauf- und Leasingverträge (Schulthess 2003) 32 ff and Marlis
Koller-Tumler, in: Jolanta Kren Kostkiewicz et al (eds), Schweizerisches
Obligationenrecht (OR) – Kommentar (2nd edn, Orell Füssli 2009)
Art 40 a para 7.
54 See however for the prevailing opposite view Mikael Schmelzer, Der
Konsumentenvertrag (Rüegger 1995) 185.
55 See in depth Peter Jung, ‘Die systematische Stellung der offenen AGB-
Inhaltskontrolle im UWG – Vertrags- und wettbewerbsrechtliche Folge-
probleme‘, in: Alexander Brunner/Anton K. Schnyder/Andrea Eisner-
Kiefer (eds), Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen nach neuem Schweizer
Recht (Schulthess 2013) 129 ff.
56 Peter Jung (supra note 55) 132.
57 DFT (BGE/ATF/DTF) 120 II, 76, 78; FT (BGer/TF/TF) sic! 2001, 317,
318.
58 DFT (BGE/ATF/DTF) 82 II 544, 548; DFT (BGE/ATF/DTF) 117 IV
193, 197 ff; FT (BGer/TF/TF) sic! 1999, 576, 578.
59 Peter Jung (supra note 55) 133 ff.
60 Jörg Schmid (supra note 20) 17 ff; Hubert Stöckli (supra note 33) 187;
Thomas Probst, ‘Die richterliche Inhaltskontrolle Allgemeiner
Geschäftsbedingungen im schweizerischen Recht: Ein rückblickender
Ausblick in die Zukunft‘, in: Peter Jung (ed), Richterliche Eingriffe in
den Vertrag (Sellier 2013) 223, 258 und Eugénie Holliger-Hagmann
(supra note 50) para 33.
61 Art 129 and Art 136 Swiss PILA.
62 Art 112 ff Swiss PILA.
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ered to be a claim under unfair competition law, it would be
principally governed by the law of the state in whose market
the distortion of competition occurred (Art 136 (1) Swiss
Private International Law Act – Swiss PILA). In addition,
according to Swiss international private law, a choice of law
could only be made after the damage occurred and only in
favour of the law of the forum (Art 132 Swiss PILA). In
contrast, if the control of unfair contract terms is considered
to be a question of contract law as in most other countries, it
would be governed by the law chosen by the parties (Art 116
(1) Swiss PILA). However, there are some exceptions. A
choice of law clause is for example not permitted in consumer
contracts (Art 120 (2) Swiss PILA). Failing a valid choice of
law, contracts would be governed by the law of the state to
which they have the closest connection (Art 117 Swiss PILA).
This is of course the more adequate solution.
2. The Misplacement of Content Control from a
Competition Law Perspective
The misplacement of the control of unfair contract terms in
the law against unfair competition does not only give rise to
conflicts with contract law, but also with competition law.
As already mentioned, the UCA according to its Art 1 shall
protect competition in its entirety in the interest of all stake-
holders and not only protect the specific interests of consu-
mers63. That is why the restriction of the control to consumer
contracts might be in line with contract law and Directive 93/
13/EEC. However, it is certainly not in line with the princi-
ples of competition law. It must be seen as the result of a
political compromise obtained last minute in the Swiss Parlia-
ment in order to enable the enactment of the whole reform
act64.
However, standard terms can still be unfair in the light of
Art 2 UCA which is the omnibus clause aiming to ban any
kind of unfair competition having an impact on the market65.
Therefore, if the general terms are misleading or if their usage
represents aggressive business practice, they could be consid-
ered as void according to Art 2 UCA even in a business-to-
business relation. But if the unfairness of standard terms is
only due to their imbalanced content, it will be difficult to
bypass and counteract the restriction of Art 8 UCA expressly
wanted by the legislator by applying Art 2 UCA in the busi-
ness-to-business area66. At best, the omnibus clause may
apply if the other party is as worthy to be protected as a
consumer is67. A small business entity, for example, can be in
the described position due to its structural dependence68. It is
doubtful whether the disproportion of contractual rights and
obligations should be assessed in a less strict way if the
standard terms are solely used towards professionals69. This
question is also well known and very much discussed in Ger-
man law70.
Other substantive restrictions of Art 8 UCA, which can only
be explained by referring to contract law, lead to problems
from a competition law perspective as well. There is a limita-
tion to the effective use of the standard terms. Accordingly,
the mere advertising of standard terms or the giving of advice
to other companies to make use of the standard terms can
represent an act of competition but do not fall under Art 8
UCA71. Furthermore, a significant and unjustified dispropor-
tion of the contractual rights and obligations has to be pre-
sent according to Art 8 UCA. Thus, the question whether or
not other specific provisions of the UCA or the omnibus
clause should be applied will be asked in various cases where
Art 8 UCA is not applicable due to the mentioned restrictions
resulting from contract law.
The last problem caused by the misplacement of the control
of standard terms in competition law is linked to the sanc-
tions. The UCA provides for several possible sanctions72. If a
behaviour is considered to be unfair pursuant to the omnibus
clause or one of the special provisions which Art 8 UCA is
part of, the consumers, the competitors, the business organi-
sations, the consumer organisations and – under additional
circumstances – also the Swiss state can sue73. They may
request to prohibit an imminent infringement, to remove an
ongoing infringement or to establish the unlawful nature of
an infringement if its consequences still subsist (Art 9 (1)
UCA). They can also require that a rectification or the judge-
ment shall be communicated to third parties or be published
(Art 9 (2) UCA). Apart from this, actions for damages, moral
compensation and the disgorgement of profit are available
under the UCA for consumers and competitors (Art 9 (3)
UCA). Compared to other special provisions in the UCA74,
there are no criminal consequences if a behaviour is against
Art 8 or Art 2 UCA.
But it is not explicitly regulated in the UCA what happens
with the standard terms if they violate Art 8 UCA. Agree-
ment prevails to a large extent that the appropriate conse-
quence is partial invalidity of the respective terms75. The
invalidity results from Art 20 (1) of the Swiss Code of Ob-
ligations which states that if a contract is against the law, it
should be void. This legal consequence is in fact not typical
for the unfair competition law which normally does not deal
with the question of the validity of a contract concluded in
violation of the UCA76. The legislator would have been better
advised to clarify the legal consequences of Art 8 UCA on the
occasion of the revision. At least at one point, the placement
of the content control in competition law provides for some
clarity: It is inadmissible to reduce an unfair term to its legally
permitted core77 since that would violate the transparency
rule established under unfair competition law. This is because
the reduced interpretation at a later time would not corre-
spond with the recognizable meaning the clause had at the
conclusion of the contract.
63 Peter Jung (supra note 39) Art 1 paras 22 ff.
64 See for Art 8 as a political compromise Markus Hess/Lea Ruckstuhl
(supra note 23) 1188 ff.
65 Peter Jung (supra note 39) Art 2 paras 7 and 9 ff.
66 Isabelle Wildhaber, ‘Inhaltskontrolle von Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedin-
gungen im unternehmerischen Verkehr‘ [2011] SJZ 537, 544.
67 Peter Jung (supra note 55) 155.
68 Botschaft zu einem Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb
(UWG) vom 18. Mai 1983, BBl. 1983 II, 1009, 1073 and Botschaft zur
Änderung des Bundesgesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG)
vom 2. September 2009, BBl 2009, 6151, 6179.
69 Botschaft UWG BBl 2009, 6151, 6179.
70 See in depth Reinhard Lutz, AGB-Kontrolle im Handelsverkehr unter
Berücksichtigung der Klauselverbote (C.H. Beck 1991) 3 ff.
71 Peter Jung (supra note 55) 157.
72 Art 9 paras 1 and 2 UCA.
73 Philippe Spitz, in: Peter Jung/Philippe Spitz (eds), Bundesgesetz gegen
den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) – Kommentar (Stämpfli 2010) Art 9
paras 8 ff.
74 Art 3, 4, 4 a, 5 or 6 according to Art 23 (1) UCA.
75 Botschaft zur Änderung des Bundesgesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wett-
bewerb (UWG) vom 2. September 2009, BBl 2009, 6152 and 6179; Jörg
Schmid (supra note 20) 16 and Ingeborg Schwenzer, Schweizerisches
Obligationenrecht – Allgemeiner Teil (6th edn, Stämpfli 2012)
para 46.05; concerning Directive 93/13/EEC: ECJ at 26.6.2000, ECLI:
EU:C:2000:346, Case C-240/98 to C-244/98 (Océano), para 30.
76 Peter Jung (supra note 55) 160.
77 FT (BGer/TF/TF) 4A_404/2008 E. 5.6.3.2.1; Arnold F. Rusch/Philip R.
Bornhauser, ‘Korrektiv zur Freizeichnung von der Hilfspersonenhaf-
tung‘ [2010] AJP 1228, 1237 ff; Ernst A. Kramer, in: Arthur Meier-
Hayoz (ed), Berner Kommentar, t. IV/1/2/1 a (Inhalt des Vertrages)
(Stämpfli 1991) Art 19/20 para 377.
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V. Conclusion
Art 8 is a real cuckoo’s egg in the UCA – more than ever since
the revision of 201278. With the removal of the „misleading
criterion„79, the sole characteristic attribute relating to unfair
competition law has been eliminated and replaced by an
ambiguous principle of good faith. The Swiss placement of
the content review of general contract terms in the Act
against Unfair Competition is not an example to follow80.
The aim and the underlying concept of the provision is a
contractual one and should therefore be classified accord-
ingly. But a contractual interpretation would completely
ignore the embedding of the provision in the Act against
Unfair Competition. However, if the location of Art 8 UCA
in unfair competition law is taken seriously, this would not
be in line with the intent of the legislator and the need for an
effective and unrestricted content control of standard terms.
In the perspective of contract law, the provision is also
incomplete due to neither defining the notion of “standard
terms” nor the notion of “consumer” and not containing a
black- or at least a grey list of unfair clauses. The only
advantage of the location in the UCA consists in the possi-
bility of a preventive and collective legal protection for
example by consumer organisations or even the Swiss state.
Also striking a balance between aspects related either to
contract or to competition law is not a feasible approach
because this would be inconsistent and increase legal uncer-
tainty. Therefore, the lively debate on an adequate provision
concerning the content review of standard terms in Swiss
law will only come to rest if the provision will be integrated
into the general contract law or will be dealt with in a special
act. &
78 Eugénie Holliger-Hagmann (supra note 50).
79 To cancel this criterion was one of the main subjects of the revision
because it led to the inapplicability of Art 8 UCA, Ahmet Kut/Demian
Stauber (supra note 8) para 109.
80 See in depth Peter Jung (supra note 55) 129 ff.
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